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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Raymond J. Battaglia, Sr. ("Battaglia") appeals from an 
order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania (the "District Court") that granted 
summary judgment in favor of Mary Ann McKendry, Mary 
Anne Battaglia, James Doorcheck, Inc., Raymond Battaglia, 
Jr. and James Battaglia (collectively, the"Appellees"), 
denied Battaglia's cross-motion for summary judgment and 
ordered that the parties' claims be arbitrated without 
further delay. Battaglia claims on appeal that the District 
Court erred by failing to hold that under Pennsylvania law 
the arbitrator does not have the authority to deter mine 
whether an issue is arbitrable. We conclude that the 
District Court did rule on this issue, and we affirm its 
ruling that under Pennsylvania law it was for the Court to 
determine the scope of the arbitration clause. Battaglia also 
asserts on appeal that the District Court err ed in finding 
that the arbitration clause was broad enough to reach (i) 
disputes relating to the formation of the underlying 
settlement agreement, and (ii) disputes arising from a 
related consulting agreement. We affirm the District Court's 
determination that the arbitration clause is sufficiently 
broad to reach disputes relating to the formation of the 
settlement agreement. However, because we conclude that 
there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute with 
respect to the integration of the settlement and consulting 
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agreements, we reverse and remand to the District Court to 
reconsider, in light of this opinion, whether the arbitration 
clause in the settlement agreement reaches disputes arising 
from the consulting agreement. 
 
I. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Jurisdiction was proper in the District Court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1332. We have jurisdiction over the District 
Court's final order compelling arbitration under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 
Our review of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. 
Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 343 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
       [S]ummary judgment should be granted if, after 
       drawing all reasonable inferences fr om the underlying 
       facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
       party, the court concludes that there is no genuine 
       issue of material fact to be resolved at trial and [that] 
       the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
       law. 
 
Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling- 
Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
"Summary judgment may be granted based on the 
interpretation of a contract only if `the contract is so clear 
that it can be read only one way.' " PaineWebber Inc. v. 
Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1378 (3d Cir . 1993) (quoting Tigg 
Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 
1987)). 
 
II. FACTS 
 
Battaglia is the father of Mary Ann McKendry, Raymond 
Battaglia, Jr. and James Battaglia and the father-in-law of 
Mary Anne Battaglia. Battaglia is also the for mer President 
of James Doorcheck, Inc. (the "Company"). Raymond 
Battaglia. Jr. and James Battaglia ar e the President and the 
Secretary/Treasurer, r espectively, of the Company. 
Raymond Battaglia, Jr., James Battaglia and Mary Ann 
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McKendry are each one-third shareholders in the Company. 
They held the same ownership interests and control of the 
Company in November 1990, at the time of the settlement 
at issue in this case. 
 
Appellees Mary Ann McKendry and Mary Anne Battaglia 
are trustees under the Agreement of T rust of Mary A. 
Battaglia (the wife, now deceased, of Battaglia), dated 
March 12, 1985 (the "Trust").1 The Trust provides, among 
other things, that the "Trustees shall distribute to my 
husband, RAYMOND, all of the net income in annual or 
more frequent periodic installments." Upon Battaglia's 
death, the Trust provides that "the balance of principal 
then remaining of this trust shall be distributed to my 
[Mary A. Battaglia's] children." 
 
Following his wife's death, Battaglia filed an action 
against the Appellees and others in the District Court 
captioned Battaglia v. Brantz, et al., Civil Action No. 90- 
1511 (the "Litigation"). In the Litigation, Battaglia 
complained that the trustees were not investing Trust 
assets in order to maximize income, but instead were 
maximizing principal to benefit themselves. It is not clear 
from the record what allegations wer e made with respect to 
the Company. In any event, the parties resolved the 
Litigation by entering into a settlement agr eement (the 
"Settlement Agreement") and a consulting agreement (the 
"Consulting Agreement," and together with the Settlement 
Agreement, the "Agreements").2 A form of the Consulting 
Agreement was attached to the Settlement Agr eement as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While the Trust document names Geor ge M. Brantz, Esq. ("Brantz") as 
a third trustee, it is not clear whether Brantz remains a trustee. 
 
2. Although there is no dispute that the settlement of the Litigation was 
memorialized in two separate documents -- the Settlement Agreement 
and the Consulting Agreement -- the parties apparently dispute whether 
the documents were executed concurrently. Battaglia asserts that the 
Consulting Agreement was executed on September 1, 1990, while the 
Settlement Agreement was executed on November 29, 1990. While the 
dates on the Agreements support Battaglia's position, the Appellees 
claim that they were executed concurrently on or about November 29, 
1990, that language in the Settlement Agreement and Consulting 
Agreement supports their assertion and that the Consulting Agreement 
was merely backdated at Battaglia's insistence. 
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Exhibit A. The Settlement Agreement provides, among other 
things, that "[t]he Trustees shall invest the Trust assets in 
such a way as to maximize the income to Battaglia during 
his lifetime." 
 
The Settlement Agreement contains several r eferences to 
the Consulting Agreement: 
 
       NOW, THEREFORE, intending to be fully and legally 
       bound, and in consideration of the mutual pr omises 
       set forth herein, the parties hereto agr ee as follows: 
 
        1. Simultaneously with the execution of this 
       Settlement Agreement, Battaglia and the Company 
       have entered into a Consulting Agreement in the form 
       attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
 
        **** 
 
        8. All parties to this Settlement Agr eement will act 
       in good faith to secure to Battaglia the benefits of this 
       Settlement Agreement and all of the amounts due to 
       him under the Consulting Agreement, and will cause 
       the Company to do likewise. In the event of a transfer 
       of Company assets . . . or of a transfer of a contr olling 
       interest in the stock of the Company, the Company 
       shall take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that 
       the obligations due to Battaglia under the Consulting 
       Agreement are paid by the transfer ee. 
 
       The Consulting Agreement also refers to the Settlement 
       Agreement: 
 
        11. Miscellaneous. . . . The Settlement Agreement 
       executed concurrently with this Consulting Agr eement, 
       to which Settlement Agreement the Company and the 
       Consultant, among others, are parties, does not merge 
       into this Consulting Agreement. 
 
The Settlement Agreement, which is gover ned by 
Pennsylvania law, contains an arbitration clause (the 
"Arbitration Clause"): 
 
        9. This Settlement Agreement and the obligations 
       created hereunder shall be interpr eted under the laws 
       of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the parties 
       hereto further agree that in the event that any 
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       controversy arises hereunder, venue in Philadelphia, 
       Pennsylvania with the American Arbitration Association 
       is appropriate for the resolution of such controversy. 
 
The Consulting Agreement, on the other hand, does not 
contain an arbitration clause. 
 
On December 29, 1997, Battaglia initiated arbitration 
proceedings against the trustees with the American 
Arbitration Association and alleged failure of the trustees to 
abide by the terms of the Settlement Agr eement. In 
particular, Battaglia complained that the trustees were not 
investing Trust assets to maximize income to Battaglia as 
required under the Settlement Agreement. On February 17, 
1998, the Appellees filed a counterclaim in the arbitration 
proceeding alleging, among other things, that the 
Settlement Agreement was void from its inception by reason 
of egregious duress committed by Battaglia. Battaglia's 
subsequent motion to dismiss the arbitration counter claim 
was itself dismissed by the arbitrator, T imothy B. Barnard, 
Esq. (the "Arbitrator"). 
 
On October 7, 1998, Battaglia filed a Verified Complaint 
in the District Court and sought a temporary r estraining 
order enjoining the arbitration. The District Court denied 
the request for a temporary restraining or der. 
 
The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. In a Memorandum and Order dated 
July 29, 1999 (the "Memorandum Opinion"), the District 
Court denied Battaglia's motion for summary judgment and 
granted the Appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment. 
The District Court ordered that the parties' claims be 
arbitrated "without further delay." After judgment was 
entered in favor of the Appellees and against Battaglia on 
August 3, 1999, he filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
We address in order the thr ee issues Battaglia raises on 
appeal: (1) who determines the scope of the Arbitration 
Clause; (2) is the Arbitration Clause sufficiently broad to 
cover disputes related to formation of the Settlement 
Agreement; and (3) whether the Arbitration Clause in the 
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Settlement Agreement reaches disputes under the 
Consulting Agreement, which does not contain its own 
agreement to arbitrate. 
 
A. 
 
First, we must decide who has the authority under 
Pennsylvania law to determine the scope of the Arbitration 
Clause -- the Court or the Arbitrator. The issue arises 
because Battaglia questions whether the Arbitrator had the 
authority to decide whether the Appellees' dur ess 
counterclaim is arbitrable. By granting the Appellees' 
motion for summary judgment and indeed by dir ect 
statement in its Memorandum Opinion, the District Court 
made a ruling that it was for the Court to deter mine the 
scope of the Arbitration Clause. "[Battaglia's] attempts to 
raise the actual merits of the claims here ar e completely 
irrelevant to the issue of arbitrability, which is the only 
issue before the Court. See AT&T T echnologies, Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 649 . . . 
(1986) (arbitrability of a dispute is for the court to decide)." 
Memorandum Opinion at 11. Cf. Flightways Corp. v. 
Keystone Helicopter Corp., 331 A.2d 184, 185 (Pa. 1975). 
"[W]hen deciding whether the parties agr eed to arbitrate a 
certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally . . . 
should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 
formation of contracts." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Under Pennsylvania law, 
"the threshold question of whether a party agreed to 
arbitrate a dispute is a jurisdictional question that must be 
decided by a court." Smith v. Cumberland Gr oup, Ltd., 687 
A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Furthermore, there 
is no indication -- in the language of the Arbitration Clause 
or otherwise in the record before this Court -- that the 
parties intended to arbitrate the scope of the Clause itself. 
Consequently, this determination was pr operly made by the 
District Court. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944 ("[C]ourts 
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate 
arbitrability unless there is `clea[r] and unmistak[able] 
evidence that they did so.") (second and thir d alterations in 
original). 
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B. 
 
Battaglia's next argument on appeal is that the 
Arbitration Clause is limited to disputes involving the 
interpretation and performance of the Settlement 
Agreement, and thus the Clause does not encompass 
disputes going to the formation of that Agr eement. In 
particular, Battaglia asserts that because the Arbitration 
Clause uses the language "any controversy[that] arises 
hereunder [i.e., under the Settlement Agreement]," rather 
than broader language such as "any contr oversy arising 
under or related to the Settlement Agreement," the 
Arbitration Clause does not encompass the Appellees' 
counterclaim in the arbitration proceeding alleging that the 
Settlement Agreement was void from its inception by reason 
of egregious duress committed by Battaglia. For the reasons 
set forth below, we agree with the District Court that the 
Arbitration Clause is sufficiently broad to r each disputes 
regarding the formation of the Settlement Agreement. 
 
In construing the scope of an arbitration clause, courts 
generally operate under a pronounced "pr esumption of 
arbitrability": 
 
       [W]here the contract contains an arbitration clause, 
       there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that 
       "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should 
       not be denied unless it may be said with positive 
       assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible 
       of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 
       Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 
 
AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (second alteration in 
original)(quoting United Steelworkers v. W arrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960)). The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted an identical rule. 
See Lincoln Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ. 
v. Lincoln Univ. Chapter of the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 
354 A.2d 576, 581-82 (Pa. 1976). This presumption of 
arbitrability is particularly applicable wher e the arbitration 
clause at issue is broad. See AT&T T echs., 475 U.S. at 650 
(finding to be broad a clause providing for arbitration of 
"any differences arising with r espect to the interpretation of 
this contract or the performance of any obligation 
hereunder"). 
 
                                8 
  
In ordering arbitration, the District Court r elied on the 
presumption of arbitrability and on the "expansive, all- 
encompassing language" of the Arbitration Clause. 
Memorandum Opinion at 8-9. Cf. Flightways, 331 A.2d at 
185 (broad language -- that arbitration is agreed for "[a]ny 
controversy or claim arising out of or r elating to this 
Agreement" -- "cannot be circumvented by an allegation 
that the contract was void ab initio because of fraud in the 
inducement"). 
 
In arguing that the Arbitration Clause has a more limited 
scope, Battaglia relies on In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 
951 (2d Cir. 1961), and cases relying thereon. But this line 
of cases has been discredited both in the Second Circuit 
and in other jurisdictions. In Kinoshita, the Second Circuit 
found that an arbitration provision providing for arbitration 
of "any dispute or difference . . . aris[ing] under" the 
contract containing the clause was not sufficiently broad to 
require arbitration of a claim alleging fraudulent 
inducement of the contract. See Kinoshita, 287 F.2d at 953. 
The Second Circuit explained that when an arbitration 
provision refers only to disputes "under" or "arising out of " 
a contact, arbitration is limited to disputes r elating to the 
interpretation of the contract and matters of performance. 
See id. The Court distinguished the arbitration clause at 
issue from clauses including disputes "r elating to" a 
contract, stating that the latter would encompass claims of 
fraud in the inducement. See id. 
 
Although Kinoshita has not been formally overruled by 
the Second Circuit, that Court has repeatedly distinguished 
Kinoshita and limited the case to its pr ecise facts. The 
Second Circuit first limited Kinoshita  in S.A. Mineracao da 
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 
1984), where the Court found that an arbitration clause 
requiring arbitration of "any question or dispute . . . 
aris[ing] or occur[ring] under" the agreement was 
sufficiently broad to reach claims of fraud in the 
inducement. See id. at 192. The Court noted that while the 
distinction between the arbitration clause at hand and the 
clause at issue in Kinoshita was "far fr om overwhelming," it 
was "at least as reasonable as the distinction drawn in 
Kinoshita." Id. at 194. While the Court acknowledged that 
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Kinoshita is inconsistent with the federal policy favoring 
arbitration, it declined to overrule Kinoshita  on policy 
grounds: 
 
       We decline to overrule In re Kinoshita, despite its 
       inconsistency with federal policy favoring arbitration, 
       particularly in international business disputes, 
       because we are concerned that contracting parties may 
       have (in theory at least) relied on that case in their 
       formulation of an arbitration provision. We see no 
       reason, however, why we may not confine Kinoshita to 
       its precise facts. We are confident that parties who 
       have actually relied on Kinoshita[,] in an attempt to 
       formulate a narrow arbitration pr ovision, have adopted 
       the exact language of the arbitration provision involved 
       in Kinoshita. The provision involved in Kinoshita 
       required arbitration of "any dispute or difference 
       aris[ing] under" the agreement. Thus, to ensure that an 
       arbitration clause is narrowly interpreted contracting 
       parties must use the foregoing phrase or its equivalent, 
       although the better course, obviously, would be to 
       specify exactly which claims are and ar e not arbitrable. 
 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 
The Second Circuit again distinguished Kinoshita in 
Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F .2d 840 (2d Cir. 
1987). There the Second Circuit found that an arbitration 
clause requiring arbitration of "all claims and disputes of 
whatever nature arising under this contract" was broad 
enough to reach claims of fraud in the inducement. See id. 
at 854. Although the only material differ ence between the 
clauses in Genesco and Kinoshita is that the former 
contains the phrase "of whatever nature," the Second 
Circuit rested its decision on this distinction: 
 
       The instant clause is . . . distinguishable fr om the 
       Kinoshita clause. The clause here r equires arbitration 
       of "all claims and disputes of whatever natur e arising 
       under this contract." . . . The phrase "of whatever 
       nature" indicates the parties' intent to submit all 
       claims and disputes arising under the contract to 
       arbitration, whether they be tortious or contractual in 
       nature. 
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Id. 
 
Again, the Second Circuit declined to overrule Kinoshita: 
 
       We are invited to overrule Kinoshita . While we 
       recognize, as did [S.A. Mineracao], that Kinoshita is 
       inconsistent with the federal policy favoring arbitration, 
       nevertheless, we decline the invitation. Because the 
       instant clause is distinguishable from the Kinoshita 
       clause, we need not discuss the continued viability of 
       Kinoshita. See Scherk [v. Alberto-Culver Co.], 417 U.S. 
       at 508, 94 S.Ct. at 2451 (clause requiring arbitration of 
       "any controversy or claim . . . aris[ing] out of this 
       agreement" held to cover fraudulent misr epresentations 
       claim). 
 
Id. at 854 n.6 (citation omitted) (thir d alteration in original). 
Although the Second Circuit does not discuss the 
continued viability of Kinoshita, its citation to Scherk 
implies that, even in the Second Circuit, Kinoshita is no 
longer good law.3 Cf. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Employers Reinsurance Corp., 919 F. Supp. 133, 135 
(S.D.N.Y 1996) ("In both Second Circuit cases [i.e., S.A. 
Mineracao and Genesco], . . . the court grappled with 
Kinoshita and left it in tatters. . . . As a r esult, the authority 
of Kinoshita is highly questionable in this Circuit."). 
 
In light of the negative treatment affor ded Kinoshita -- 
even within the Second Circuit -- we decline to follow those 
courts that have found Kinoshita persuasive in holding that 
an arbitration provision such as the one at issue here does 
not reach formation issues. In particular , we decline to 
follow the Ninth Circuit, which apparently continues to 
approve the teaching of Kinoshita. See Tracer Research 
Corp. v. National Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F .3d 1292, 1295 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (finding that arbitration pr ovision applying to 
disputes "arising out of " or "arising under" a contract is 
limited to disputes relating to interpr etation and 
performance of the contract itself); Mediterranean Enters., 
Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974). 
Nonetheless, the breadth of the arbitration clause was not at issue 
before the Court in Scherk. 
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1983) (finding that arbitration provision applying to 
disputes "arising hereunder" is limited to interpretation and 
performance of the underlying contract). Furthermore, we 
do not believe that the Pennsylvania courts, after 
consideration of S.A. Mineracao and Genesco, would be 
persuaded by A. Sulka & Co. v. SMI Indus., Inc. , No. 2094, 
1979 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 64 (Ct. C.R. Pa. June 26, 
1979) (following Kinoshita and holding that arbitration 
provision covering disputes "arising out of this agreement" 
is limited to disputes relating to the interpr etation and 
performance of the agreement). Not only have the 
underpinnings for the A. Sulka Court's holding been 
eroded, but we can find no evidence that the opinion has 
been cited by any other court in Pennsylvania. 
 
Instead, we will follow the Eleventh Circuit, which has 
recently rejected Kinoshita as"not being in accord with 
present day notions of arbitration as a viable alternate 
dispute resolution procedure." H.S. Gregory v. Electro- 
Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 385 (11th Cir. 1996). In 
Gregory, the Court was asked to deter mine whether the 
counts alleged in a complaint, including a count for 
fraudulent inducement, fell within an arbitration pr ovision 
providing for arbitration of "any dispute . . . which may 
arise hereunder." See id. at 383. After considering the 
structure of the complaint and its factual allegations, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that, regar dless of the plaintiffs' 
characterization of the claims, they all arose under the 
agreement and thus were encompassed within the 
arbitration provision. See id. at 384-85. As an alternate 
basis for its decision, however, the Eleventh Circuit relied 
on the Supreme Court's decision in Scherk , where the 
Court found that an arbitration clause requiring arbitration 
of any controversy or claim arising out of the agreement 
covered a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. See id. at 
385-86. In relying on Scherk, the Eleventh Circuit stated 
that it does not draw a distinction between the phrases 
"arising under" and "arising out of." See id. at 386. In fact, 
the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Scherk  Court seemed to 
use these terms interchangeably. See id. 
 
In sum, when phrases such as "arising under" and 
"arising out of " appear in arbitration pr ovisions, they are 
 
                                12 
  
normally given broad construction, and ar e generally 
construed to encompass claims going to the for mation of 
the underlying agreements. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 919 F. Supp. at 135 ("Since 1961 [when Kinoshita 
was decided], both the Supreme Court and the Second 
Circuit have taken an increasingly br oad view of such 
phrases as "arising under" and "arising out of " in 
arbitration agreements, and have concluded that fraudulent 
inducement claims generally fall within their scope."). This 
construction of an arbitration provision is consistent with 
both federal and Pennsylvania precedent holding that an 
agreement to arbitrate a particular dispute"should not be 
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that 
the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation 
that covers the asserted dispute." AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 
650; accord Lincoln Univ., 354 A.2d at 581-82. Accordingly, 
as a matter of Pennsylvania law, the Arbitration Clause is 
broad enough to encompass disputes relating to the 
formation of the Settlement Agreement. Because there is no 
genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at trial, we will 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment with 
respect to this aspect of the case. 
 
C. 
 
Battaglia's final argument on appeal is that the 
Arbitration Clause contained in the Settlement Agr eement 
is not broad enough to reach disputes arising under the 
Consulting Agreement. In particular, Battaglia contends 
that the Agreements are separate and independent and, 
therefore, that the Arbitration Clause (pr esent in only the 
Settlement Agreement) does not apply to the Consulting 
Agreement. In contrast, the District Court found that all 
disputes between the parties -- including those r elating to 
the Consulting Agreement -- were subject to the Arbitration 
Clause. The Court's decision was based on the br eadth of 
the Arbitration Clause and the Court's conclusion, based 
on the language of the Agreements, that "the parties 
intended for the Settlement and Consulting Agr eements to 
be interdependent and interrelated documents." 
Memorandum Opinion at 10. We agree with the District 
Court that the applicability of the Arbitration Clause to the 
 
                                13 
  
Consulting Agreement turns on whether the Settlement 
Agreement and the Consulting Agreement should be 
construed as a single integrated agreement. But because we 
believe that there are genuine issues of material fact in 
dispute with respect to the integration of the Agreements, 
we conclude that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on this issue. 
 
On the one hand, there exists evidence that the 
Agreements were intended to be interpr eted as a single 
integrated agreement. First, it is undisputed that both 
Agreements memorialized the terms of the settlement of a 
single litigation. According to the ter ms of the Agreements 
and statements made by the Appellees in affidavitsfiled 
with the District Court, the Agreements wer e executed 
concurrently. Furthermore, a for m of Consulting Agreement 
is attached to the Settlement Agreement as Exhibit A, and 
the Agreements contain various refer ences to each other. 
Most significantly, the Settlement Agreement obligates all 
parties thereto to "act in good faith to secure to Battaglia 
. . . all of the amounts due to him under the Consulting 
Agreement, and will cause the Company to do likewise." 
 
On the other hand, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Battaglia (as we must), the Agr eements may be 
viewed as independent agreements, in which case the 
Arbitration Clause would not apply to disputes arising 
under the Consulting Agreement. First, the parties to the 
Agreements are not the same. While all the Appellees are 
parties to the Settlement Agreement, only the Company is 
a party to the Consulting Agreement.4  In Battaglia's Verified 
Complaint filed in the District Court, he states that "[i]n 
order to resolve the dispute between Battaglia and the 
Trustees, paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agr eement 
provides in pertinent part that: `[The] Trustees shall invest 
the trust assets in such a way as to maximize the income 
to Battaglia during his lifetime.' " Battaglia further explains 
that "[i]n order to resolve the dispute between Battaglia and 
Doorcheck, the Consulting Agreement was drafted and 
provided in part that Battaglia would pr ovide consulting 
services to Doorcheck in exchange for compensation." Thus, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Of course, Battaglia is a party to both Agr eements. 
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based on the limited record (which does not fully set forth 
the nature of the Litigation), it would be possible to 
conclude that the settlement was memorialized using two 
separate agreements because the relief sought against the 
Company was different from that sought against the other 
Appellees. If so, the parties may very well have intended the 
Agreements to be treated independently. 
 
Next, even though the language of the Agreements 
suggests that they were executed concurr ently,5 the 
Consulting Agreement is dated almost thr ee months prior 
to the Settlement Agreement. While Battaglia r epeatedly 
states that the Agreements were executed as dated, the 
Appellees assert that the Agreements wer e executed 
concurrently, and that the Consulting Agr eement was 
merely back-dated at Battaglia's insistence. If the 
Consulting Agreement was executed three months prior to 
the Settlement Agreement, the argument that the 
Agreements must be interpreted together loses some of its 
force. 
 
Finally, the Consulting Agreement is a valid contract on 
its face and could well be the product of a settlement of 
claims relating to Battaglia's alleged "ouster" as President of 
the Company. The terms of the Consulting Agr eement are 
fully set forth therein and, contrary to thefinding of the 
District Court,6 the Consulting Agreement does not rely on 
the Settlement Agreement for its terms. In fact, the 
Consulting Agreement's only reference to the Settlement 
Agreement -- in Paragraph 11 that "[t]he Settlement 
Agreement . . . does not merge into this Consulting 
Agreement" -- suggests a finding that the parties intended 
to treat the Agreements independently. A typical merger 
clause might state that "this agreement mer ges all prior 
negotiations and understandings between the parties and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Settlement Agreement provides that "[s]imultaneously with the 
execution of this Settlement Agreement, Battaglia and the Company have 
entered into a Consulting Agreement." The Consulting Agreement refers 
to the Settlement Agreement "executed concurrently." 
 
6. The District Court found that "[i]t is the Settlement Agreement[ ] 
which 
sets forth the terms of the Consulting Agr eement." Memorandum 
Opinion at 11. 
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constitutes their entire agreement." In other words, the 
standard merger clause causes prior negotiations and 
understandings to merge into and be extinguished by the 
subsequent agreement.7 By placing into the Consulting 
Agreement an anti-merger concept, it is plausible that the 
parties here were merely trying to underscore the 
independence of each Agreement. Battaglia especially had 
every incentive to assure that the payment pr ovisions of the 
Consulting Agreement were independent beyond 
peradventure from the Settlement Agr eement. 
 
Because the evidence before the District Court regarding 
the independence/inter-dependence of the Agr eements is 
inconclusive, the District Court improperly granted the 
Appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the District 
Court with respect to this issue and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
As set forth above, the District Court correctly 
determined that under Pennsylvania law it was for the 
Court -- and not the Arbitrator -- to deter mine whether an 
issue (in this case, the Appellees' duress claim) is arbitrable 
within the scope of the Arbitration Clause. Also, because we 
find that the Arbitration Clause is broad enough to 
encompass disputes relating to the formation of the 
Settlement Agreement, we will affirm the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment with respect to this aspect of 
the case. However, because there is a genuine issue of 
material fact in dispute with respect to the 
independence/interdependence of the Settlement and 
Consulting Agreements, we will reverse the judgment of the 
District Court with respect to this issue and r emand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This concept is distinct from integration. If agreement A merges into 
agreement B, the terms of agreement A are extinguished. On the other 
hand, if agreements A and B are deemed integrated, the provisions of 
agreement A are not extinguished, but rather are read in conjunction 
with the terms of agreement B. 
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